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Social Norms and Aberrations: Violence 




Much excellent philosophical anthropology has shown that certain sorts 
of behavior must be considered unacceptable because incompatible with 
social cohesion. Violence, cruelty, rudeness, and other behavior which 
indicates lack of respect for persons tear at the fabric of society, and 
it may be supposed that for any group there is a point beyond which 
the accumulation of acts of violence, cruelty, or even rudeness, implies 
distintegration, below which point there is stability, and around which 
point crisis or an unsteady equilibrium exists. By a series of small and 
plausible transitions the putative empirical generalization, or regularity, 
represented in such terms may be transformed into a statement about the 
normative attitudes of persons in stable groups. The generalization may 
in the first place be more strongly construed as a statement of law govern- 
ing any society. The weakening of bonds between persons implied by 
the prevalence of behavior of the kinds in question means that societies 
not only do not but cannot survive a certain excess of it. Such a natural law 
may in turn be reflected internally by certain regulations-civil laws and 
customs-prohibiting such behavior, or, more strongly, by internalized 
rules with which most persons not only act in accordance but also accept 
as stipulating what one ought to do or avoid. The observable frailty of 
social constitutions is thus reflected from within as a family of obligations 
-of differing strength depending upon the seriousness of the kind of 
behavior-to refrain from violence, cruelty, rudeness, and similar acts, 
at least so long as there are no alternative means to an important and 
justifiable end. Such behavior may have its place, but that place must be 
an unusual one, a situation involving imminent disaster or an intolerable 
condition responsive only to extreme measures. To pass from regulations 
to internalized rules in this way is to suggest that the essentially prudential 
considerations upon which reasonable regulations are based are reinforced 
by conceptual ones which make it impossible rationally to value violation 
22 
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23 Social Norms and Aberrations 
of such regulations. That such reinforcement occurs is undeniable, but 
it is not well understood why, or universally believed that, resistance to it 
is irrational. 
A possible obstacle to understanding may be avoided by noting that 
the view summarized in the anthropological model just described and 
elaborated in what follows is not necessarily contrary to conflict theories 
of society, so long as these are interpreted in even vaguely plausible ways. 
There is no necessary disagreement or agreement, for example, with a 
Hegelian, ethological, or evolutionary view according to which there is 
a point below which ostensibly dysfunctional behavior must not fall if 
society is to avoid morbidity. The existence of such a point would not 
indicate the possibility of a transition from the necessity of such behavior 
to the encouragement of it, since, even if a detached philosopher or scien- 
tist could perceive the functionality of such behavior, it might well be 
considered deplorable by the major portion of the group involved. flmile 
Durkheim made a similar point in connection with criminal behavior, 
which he considered socially valuable but possibly abhorrent, without 
however discerning the moral dilemma incipient in this suggestion.1 He 
also provided the material for a solution, though, in noting continual 
change in conceptions of the criminal. The possibility of different view- 
points about the same phenomenon suggests, in the light of the dilemma 
just mentioned, that one may abhor but not value what he considers 
criminal, whereas if one finds something valuable or necessary he cannot 
consider it criminal but only unlawful. In this way enlightened societies, 
recognizing the inevitability of "crime" in changing times but not wishing 
to encourage disrespect for law, may discard earlier conceptions of crimi- 
nality and culpability and consider the lawbreaker a victim of unfortunate 
circumstance. Similarly, behavior which an external observer takes to be 
necessary violence may be otherwise described and regarded from within, 
so that there is no need to accept rules specifically enjoining behavior 
which indicates disrespect for others. 
Such comments prompt two important questions. First, if the same 
behavior may be differently regarded from different viewpoints, how are 
criteria for the proper application of the relevant concepts to -be deter- 
mined? Second, even if acceptance of certain norms must characterize the 
dominant portion of society, this fact does not itself preclude aberrant 
values on the part of a minority. Is it not the case, therefore, that in spite 
of formidable social and psychological constraints, the sorts of behavior 
in question may be logically possible values of rational, though estranged, 
individuals? Preliminary answers may be given in terms of a distinction 
between "institutional" and "social" facts which indicates first, that the 
1. See The Rules of Sociological Method (New York, 1964), pp. 65-73. Durkheim 
believed that crime is actually necessary to society in the same way that pain, though 
undesirable, is useful to the individual organism. The analogy suggests a different con- 
clusion, however: It is not pain but sensitivity to pain which is necessary to the mature 
organism, not crime but the possibility of crime to the mature society. 
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concepts in question are primitive, so that criteria for their use cannot be 
exhaustively specified but must instead be simply given within a cultural 
context, and, second, that in spite of this evident relativity of evaluation 
certain categories of behavior cannot be coherently valued except as means 
to an end incompatible with them. Arguments similar to those to be 
employed here could also be used to show that the positive counterparts 
of such behavior-peaceableness, kindness, courtesy-are valued not as ends 
but as necessary means to what men naturally desire, but such arguments 
are indicated only in passing. 
John R. Searle has recently developed a concept of "institutional 
facts" characteristic of games, like basketball, of practices, like promising, 
and of explicitly contractual relationships, like marriage, any of which can 
be defined in terms of rules which constitute them. Such rules typically 
have the form "such-and-such behavior counts as such-and-such an act 
under such-and-such conditions," where those conditions can be specified 
exhaustively and give instructions for the identification of the act, or 
institutional fact, in question. The identification of such a fact thus depends 
upon certain understandings about how otherwise insignificant behavior 
(such as uttering the words "I do" or throwing a ball through a hoop) 
is to be regarded (as getting married or scoring, for example).2 Because 
such facts can be perceived only within a context of shared or shareable 
interests, experiences, and expectations, they can appropriately be termed 
"social" as well as "institutional." The two terms may also be used, 
however, to mark an important distinction, for the first is more widely 
applicable. Many social facts lack explicit definition in terms of consti- 
tutive rules. Such rules establish the criteria of identification for institu- 
tional facts in a given society, but criteria for the identification of other 
social facts may be far more elusive because the conditions under which 
such identification is to be made cannot be specified for these facts. The 
facts in question have to do not with the formalized behavior character- 
istic of isolable institutions but with that governed by attitudes vaguer, 
more important, and more pervasive than anything which can be codified 
in rule book or statute. They include such facts as violence, cruelty, 
rudeness, and a host of similar sorts of ordinarily unacceptable behavior 
together with their normal counterparts,3 and they bear considerable 
resemblance to Durkheim's social facts.4 By including aberrations as well 
2. See John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 50-53. 
3. Even omitting mention of the positive counterparts of such behavior a full list 
would be quite long, and the examples used here are merely representative. Others 
include contempt, insolence, discrimination, brutality, savagery. The concepts also have 
formal similarities to such moral qualities as cowardice and intemperance and to the 
"aesthetic qualities" discussed by Frank Sibley in the article "Aesthetic Concepts," 
Philosophical Review 68 (1959) :421-50. 
4. Durkheim, chap, 1. 
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as norms, however, the concept employed here weakens and blurs Durk- 
heim's conditions of constraint and generality, which are obvious distilla- 
tions from the concepts of importance and pervasiveness. 
Justification of the distinction between social and institutional facts 
is provided by fuller discussion of the characteristic features of the former 
in the following section. Some of the important consequences of the dis- 
tinction should be mentioned immediately. Whereas anyone who under- 
stands English can be enabled to recognize an institutional fact of an 
English-speaking people by being told the rules which constitute it, 
recognition of other social facts may be less simple. All that is required 
for recognition of an institutional fact is knowledge of the specified con- 
ditions under which certain overt behavior is regarded in a given group 
to constitute a certain act. Where such conditions are unspecifiable, 
however, recognition of a social fact may require the sort of understand- 
ing which is characteristic of integration with the group in question, and 
lacking which there is always an element of inference in characterizations 
of behavior. Moreover, even if an outsider has been told that certain 
behavior is rude, for example, he may be unable to consider it genuinely 
rude if his own criteria of such behavior differ, whereas if he knows the 
rules constitutive of some form of activity, such as marriage or promising, 
then he will recognize that to do certain things is genuinely to perform 
that activity. In the case of many social facts, in other words, one will have 
a tendency to speak not of what is so-and-so but of what is considered 
so-and-so, but one will require no such distinction in the case of institu- 
tional facts. Although similar institutions have different constitutive rules 
in different societies, the fact that such rules actually define institutional 
activities permits one to say not just that certain behavior is considered 
to constitute a certain activity, but that it does constitute it. 
An important consequence of the difference between institutional 
and social facts is examined in what follows. It is clear that the ability 
to recognize an institutional fact does not presuppose acceptance of the 
values and obligations characteristic of the institution in question. The 
relatively circumscribed nature and easy identifiability of institutional 
facts permit detached observation and a distinction between observation 
and acceptance of the normative features of the facts in question. On the 
other hand, the assimilation with a group required in order to recognize 
social facts about the group indicates that such recognition does involve 
acceptance of the characteristic obligations and values. In virtue of lacking 
constitutive rules, certain social facts have a sort of unanalyzability which 
makes recognition of these facts incompatible with the kind of external 
attitude possible in the case of institutional facts. The logically primitive 
character of the concepts now to be discussed makes it possible to con- 
clude that, although publicly recognizable institutions may be approved 
by some and disapproved by others, in no society can behavior publicly 
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recognized to be violent, cruel, or rude be the object of anyone's unquali- 
fied approval.5 
II 
The terms "violent," "cruel," "rude," and the like have a dual appli- 
cation. They may be applied either to persons or to their actions, or, 
more generally, to individuals or to phenomena. It is an interesting question 
whether one can discern some priority of attribution here. Is it primarily 
persons and their actions which are properly characterized in these ways, 
so that talk of "violent storms," "cruel nature," or "the rude sea" amount 
to metaphorical extensions, or are matters reversed? Fortunately, the 
question is of no logical importance. One may with equal propriety apply 
the terms in question to physical objects, animals, men, species, societies, 
groups, and many other sorts of logical individuals, or to processes, events, 
performances, human actions, and other phenomena. It is this latter distinc- 
tion between individuals and phenomena-marked grammatically by the 
difference between proper names and verbal nouns-which is the important 
one. Though abstract, it is serviceable if not abused, and in spite of present 
focus upon human beings and their behavior, points may often be made 
more clearly or gracefully in more generic terms. 
It is not the same thing to say of individuals and of phenomena that 
they are violent, cruel, or rude. There is a significant epistemological 
priority in the attribution of such features to the latter. Correctly to de- 
scribe a man as violent, cruel, or rude requires knowledge of that man's 
violent, cruel, or rude behavior; as a rule a man can be called violent only 
if he sometimes acts violently, and nothing can be called cruel or rude 
without an appropriate behavioral basis. Although saying that a person 
is cruel or kind requires reference to actions, however, so to describe 
someone is ordinarily not to describe an instance or instances of behavior 
but to ascribe a property to him in virtue of which he may behave in 
certain ways, a disposition to certain kinds of behavior. One's being 
temporarily and uncharacteristically kind does not justify ascription of 
a disposition any more than characteristic kindness precludes a latent 
disposition to cruelty. 
Not always actions show the man: we find 
Who does a kindness, is not therefore kind; 
Perhaps prosperity becalm'd his breast, 
Perhaps the wind just shifted from the east.6 
Pope's subsequently expressed skepticism is unwarranted, however. "Ac- 
tions best discover man." Individuals are known through the behavior 
5. Cf. John R. Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'," Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 43-58; and R. M. Hare, "The Promising Game," Revue international de phil- 
osophie 70 (1964): 398-412, both reprinted in Philippa Foot, Theories of Ethics (Ox- 
ford, 1967). Hare rightly objects to Searle's attempt to derive significant obligations 
from institutional facts, but his remarks cannot be generalized to social facts. 
6. Alexander Pope, Moral Essays, I, lines 109-12. 
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they exhibit, and in this sense characteristics of phenomena are concep- 
tually prior to, though often causally consequent upon, dispositions of 
individuals. 
The significance of the distinction between predicates of phenomena 
and the associated predicates of individuals resides in a logical peculiarity 
of the former. They always function modally, signifying an interpretation 
of phenomena rather than a simple fact. The most trivial of examples 
indicate that phenomena, unlike individuals, do not, strictly speaking, 
possess properties. Water may be frozen and transparent but its freezing 
is neither, though the freezing or the being transparent may under certain 
circumstances be interesting or fortunate. A woman may be intelligent and 
her being intelligent may be important, but neither the woman nor her 
state may have the characteristic of the other. One may, of course, speak 
of "an important woman," but in any appropriate context such an expres- 
sion can be readily paraphrased in terms of the phenomenon which ac- 
counts for this importance. If a woman is important because of her abili- 
ties, then she is a woman able to do important things. 
It is evident from such examples that the "properties" of phenomena 
are broadly evaluative ones, reflecting interests and expectations of persons 
concerned with given circumstances. Whereas the ability to identify 
the properties of individuals is a function of the perceptual apparatus and 
interests common to a species, identification of characteristics of phe- 
nomena is not objective in this sense but depends upon narrower personal 
and social needs and concerns. Violence, cruelty, and rudeness would be 
extraordinary characteristics of phenomena if their ascription did not 
similarly depend upon a "way of existing," and there is no reason to think 
them unusual in this respect. If they were it could hardly be the case 
that what to some is violence on television may be "action" to others, 
what the childless may consider cruelty may be discipline according to 
parents, and what is rudeness in one circle may be entirely unremarkable 
in another. 
That the predicates in question are interpretative rather than simply 
descriptive does not mean a lack of features common to instances of 
what fall under them. It does not mean that relationships between overt 
behavior and its characterization are completely extrinsic; not just any 
event may be surprising or interesting, not just any behavior may be 
regarded as violent, cruel, or rude. Violence must be potentially injurious 
or destructive, it is necessary that cruelty may cause suffering, and rude- 
ness must be capable of giving offence; or at least what is characterized 
in one of these ways must be suggestive of one of the correlated possibili- 
ties. The interpretative nature of the predicates in question means simply 
that observable correlates amounting to necessary and sufficient conditions 
for what they denote are lacking.7 Cases are easily imagined in which 
7. Contrast Philippa Foot's attempt to provide a naturalistic account of the mean- 
ing of "rude" ("Moral Arguments," Mind 67 [1958]:507-9). 
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violence fails to yield injury, cruelty does not cause suffering, or rudeness 
cause offense, and the only necessary conditions governing the characteri- 
zation of such behavior are possibilities which may not be realized in 
specific cases, although they must be realized regularly. Neither are there 
any conditions sufficient for the ascription of violence, cruelty, or rude- 
ness, for injury, pain, and offense may result from any number of things 
different from such modes of behavior. The interpretative nature of the 
features in question assures the futility of a more thorough search for 
conditions which would furnish them with complete definitions. This re- 
sult is corroborated by attention to the dispositional use of the terms in 
question, examined in more detail below, since disposition predicates are 
formally primitive terms.8 The upshot of such considerations is simply 
that no adequate account of violence, cruelty, and rudeness can be en- 
tirely naturalistic, since these partially evaluative concepts can have no 
complete definitions in terms of "natural" properties. Instead, these con- 
siderations point to nonnaturalism, though to an empirical nonnaturalism 
which can guarantee considerable interpersonal agreement. 
Such a claim must eventually be reconciled with one of the most 
interesting and significant features, noted above, of the concepts under 
discussion: the behavior which constitutes violence, cruelty, rudeness, and 
the like may be differently identified as a person's experience grows and 
expectations change. The manner of this reconciliation may be indicated 
at the same time as the tension between the claims is made more explicit. 
Connected with the interpretative element in the identification of 
such modes of behavior is a relative scarcity or aberrance in such behavior. 
Ordinarily, wind is violent if it can topple trees and a crowd violent if its 
behavior can lead t6 broken windows or bloodshed, but if one were ac- 
customed to high winds and expected crowds to become mobs, the events 
in question would be considered not violent but routine, as recent dis- 
coveries in astronomy have made solar processes once called violent now 
seem relatively benign. What one can consider normal because it is an 
ordinary part of his world can hardly be considered violent by him, how- 
ever surprising the matter-of-fact attitude of those accustomed to brutish 
conditions may be to more fortunate strangers. Similarly, what passes un- 
noticed in ordinary society cannot be rude or cruel, even if the same 
behavior elsewhere would be. In general, comparative familiarity with a 
phenomenon obviates the need for any particular characterization of it. A 
newly discovered phenomenon may be surprising or interesting, but one 
becomes accustomed to it and ceases to regard it in such ways. Because 
the factors which determine the characterization of phenomena are typi- 
cally aroused by unusual occurrences, normal states of affairs are undis- 
tinguished by such attention. It is not so much a matter of human psychol- 
ogy as of the necessarily selective nature of cognition that in an important 
8. At least the unrestricted ones discussed here are primitive (cf. Nelson Goodman, 
Fact, Fiction and Forecast [Indianapolis, 1965], pp. 46-49). 
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sense modes of phenomena exist only when recognized, and are recognized 
only if noteworthy. Significant modifications imply unusual circumstances. 
This is not, however, at all to deny the possibility of attributing normality 
to a situation. It is instead to say that such attribution may add nothing 
to what is expressed. If nothing distinguishes an action, then to say that it 
was done in a normal way, peacefully, civilly, or intentionally, adds noth- 
ing except the suggestion that the circumstances were or might have been 
peculiar, and if it is known that circumstances were not of this kind, to 
say of an action that it was intentional or of behavior that it was peaceable 
is objectionable only on grounds of triviality.9 
Within an ordinary environment there should be agreement about 
such modifications. Indeed, even in quite different environments, kinds 
of cases involving basic human interests may be subject to much less dif- 
ference in interpretation than is possible in principle. The fact that men 
are about equally concerned with and susceptible to injury and pain, for 
example, probably gives the words "violence" and "cruelty" a relatively 
stable core of application in spite of their logical characteristics. From 
within any given group generalizations about modes of behavior which 
suggest that words for them name phenomena are unlikely to yield con- 
fusion, and serious error is possible in principle only when judgments 
about violence, cruelty, or rudeness are attempted regarding other groups; 
but even in such cases criteria of violence, cruelty, and "natural" rudeness0 
probably tend to converge because human concern about injury, pain, and 
indignity is unusually persistent. 
Nevertheless, in a hostile environment one may become inured to 
almost anything, including injury, and it is to be expected that what from 
a more favored standpoint is violent may fail to be so regarded by one 
raised in the midst of turbulence or social decay. One is reminded of an 
apocryphal reply by a ghetto dweller to a reporter inquiring about recent 
violence: "What violence?" This answer has ambiguous connotations, 
however. It may simply indicate imperviousness to conditions which 
other persons find uncomfortable and thus support the generalization that 
continued exposure to a mode of behavior diminishes sensitivity to it, but 
it may instead carry a threat of worse violence to come and thus seem to 
conflict with that generalization. Obviously, nothing prevents revolution- 
aries from advocating hostile behavior for the achievement of their goals, 
and the possibility of revolutionary violence, as well as sadistic or inten- 
tionally boorish behavior, requires amendment of the general thesis that 
predicates of phenomena imply rarity of the modification described. 
Nevertheless, the thesis is basically correct for unitary groups, and the 
alteration need not be made until discussion returns to peculiarities of 
divided societies and external viewpoints. 
9. Contrast J. L. Austin's remark, "No modification without aberration," and the 
related discussion (Philosophical Papers [Oxford, 1961], pp. 137-38). 
10. Cf. Foot, "Moral Arguments," p. 507. 
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In striking contrast to the rarity implied by attributions of modes of 
phenomena, the ascription of the same predicates to individuals implies an 
appreciable frequency of behavior of the kind in question. To say that 
someone is a violent, cruel, or rude man is to characterize him as disposed 
to behavior of certain kinds in certain kinds of situations, and the linguistic 
character of disposition terms implies that any situations to which they are 
properly applied are fairly often forthcoming. In general, a disposition 
is a tendency to manifest a certain characteristic in familiar situations 
rather than unusual ones. Iron is not one of the flammable substances 
though it will burn under extreme conditions; but if those conditions 
occurred often in human environments or were easy to achieve, iron 
would properly be called flammable. Similarly, the dispositions to violence, 
cruelty, and rudeness exist as a rule only if violent, cruel, or rude behavior 
is relatively easily evoked in the individual to whom it is ascribed, that is, 
only when the conditions for its manifestations are routinely achievable. 
Since this will ordinarily be the case only when such conditions are rou- 
tinely achieved, the possession of such a disposition virtually requires a 
relatively high frequency of its manifestation. This is not, of course, a 
logical requirement. A glass object may be fragile without having ever 
manifested its fragility, and it may be conceivable that a man have a 
disposition to cruelty without ever having had a chance to act cruelly. 
Conjecture about unmanifested human dispositions is idle, however; be- 
cause glass is a fragile substance it is unnecessary to test each glass object 
for fragility in order to know that it has that property, but men are not 
samples of stuff and must be known by their deeds. 
These analytical considerations become significant for moral and so- 
cial philosophy when the results are extended to include more complex 
individuals, such as groups or societies. A group or society, clearly, can 
manifest behavior of certain kinds only if some of its members do, and 
there can hardly be a social disposition to the kinds of behavior here un- 
der discussion without there being many individuals so disposed. Again, 
as in the case of dispositions of individual men, if a society has a disposi- 
tion to violence or rudeness then a considerable manifestation of the asso- 
ciated behavior may be expected. Since it would seem that in such a state 
fragmentation is the inevitable result, a sufficiently pronounced social dis- 
position to such behavior can be only a transient state of any society. A 
certain level of violence, for example, necessarily results in radical change; 
if it is not curbed, society is altered beyond recognition. There is surely 
such a level for cruelty or rudeness as well, and it is clear that such be- 
havior cannot be the object of practical social ideals, for such ideals would 
subvert themselves. 
There is, however, a far stronger and philosophically more interesting 
reason for which violence and the like are self-defeating than one which 
has recourse to specific anthropological necessities. Such appeals ignore a 
most important dimension of social facts, the one which permits societies 
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to accommodate even to what they have regarded as violence-so long as 
the behavior in question is destructive primarily of institutions rather than 
of material requirements for existence-by ceasing so to regard it. The 
concepts of violence, cruelty, and rudeness behave in such a way that if 
the activity falling under them becomes widespread without having im- 
mediately catastrophic consequences it will cease to fall under these con- 
cepts. This is explained by an evident antagonism between the two aspects 
of such concepts. The frequency of occurrence implied by possession of 
the disposition to such behavior conflicts in one important case with the 
scarcity of that behavior implied in attributing it to actual actions. Correct 
ascription of a social disposition to violence, cruelty, or rudeness implies 
a relatively general incidence of violent, cruel, or rude acts, but charac- 
terization of these acts in such ways implies the opposite. Because the dis- 
tinction is reserved for phenomena which are relatively rare, common- 
place acts-behavior characteristic of a significant segment of society rather 
that of isolated individuals-cannot in the society in question be consid- 
ered aberrant for more than a limited period of time. This is the period, 
a generation or two, within which destructive tendencies, if uncorrected, 
result in irremediable damage to previous styles of life or within which 
attitudes toward these tendencies will have changed enough for the be- 
havior in question to be integrated within other institutions and to be 
considered normal. 
III 
Considerable substance may be given to these abstract results by 
comparing ascriptions of violence, cruelty, rudeness, and so forth, to so- 
cieties from both external and internal points of view. What can it mean, 
for example, to say, "The ancient Assyrians were a violent people"? The 
sentence implies that the Assyrians frequently acted violently, which in 
turn implies that they could not have regarded their own behavior as 
violent. Such differences in attitude seem to imply factual error: one 
would expect violent cultures to be relatively unstable, which in many 
cases they are not. Such error is avoided only by recognizing that what 
one group considers violence in another may be perfectly compatible 
with the vigorous existence of the one to which it is ascribed because it 
does not in that society constitute violence. To characterize a society or 
group as violent may be either to indicate that the behavior of its mem- 
bers is such as to render the group inherently unstable or to acknowledge 
that such a state would be incompatible with the continued stability of 
the group from the standpoint of which the assessment is made. For any 
particular type of behavior, the society which considers it violent could 
not both have a disposition to that sort of behavior and survive unchanged, 
and in characterizing a foreign culture as violent one should be clear about 
whether the judgment concerns primarily the foreign culture or one's 
own. It makes no sense to make such pronouncements as "all cultures have 
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known violence" unless this is to mean "in every society there has been 
behavior considered violent in it" or "every society has manifested be- 
havior which would be-violent in our society." Similar points may be 
made about other judgments of apparent aberrations of behavior. Francis 
Bacon's observation about "the Turks, a cruel people who nevertheless 
are kind to beasts"" is no less a reflection of English attitudes than a state- 
ment about Oriental behavior. 
Explicit ascription of pathological states to one's own society has its 
own interesting implications. Such ascription requires one to consider both 
many persons and much behavior to be violent, cruel, rude, or something 
similar, and in spite of the antagonism between such attributions to indi- 
viduals and phenomena on a social scale this is clearly possible, though 
only in transitional times or unstable periods. It means that the relevant 
sorts of behavior have become frequent without yet being accepted as 
normal. It indicates an unstable or transitional period in which behavior 
previously unusual is still considered aberrant by many, and since such 
behavior conflicts with previously prevailing standards of acceptability, the 
correct judgment that certain behavior has become frequent expresses 
recognition that the situation is critical for the survival of a way of life. 
To put it more optimistically, so long as a substantial number of people 
can recognize that aberrant behavior is rife, the possibility that the be- 
havior in question will not become normal remains; there exists the pos- 
sibility of maximizing continuity of attitudes and institutions through 
correction of conditions conducive to such behavior. On the other hand, 
whereas a society can diagnose a state of crisis in this way, it probably 
cannot diagnose its disintegration. When behavior which would previously 
have been considered violent, cruel, or rude comes to be considered nor- 
mal, attitudes must already have accommodated to its prevalence to such 
an extent that old institutions are almost certainly doomed. 
For the short run the consequences are obvious. The moral convic- 
tions and social conventions of a society's members weaken along with its 
institutions. If acts once thought aberrant have reached a frequency at 
which they can no longer be accorded the title reserved for phenomena 
which are relatively rare, then such behavior must cease to shock and a 
certain moral inertness ensue. The assassination of political leaders will 
produce the sadness natural to death but the anger appropriate to murder 
will be absent, and wars will be criticized because they are unsuccessful 
rather than because they are wrong. Cynicism is almost inevitable, and 
to an increasingly great extent behavior of a kind once abhorred becomes 
subject only to more pragmatic criteria of evaluation. Degeneration of 
moral attitudes toward the more serious aberrations, that is, inattention to 
11. "Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature," Essays, no. 13. 
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what was previously regarded as such, may thus provide a criterion of 
social or group decay.12 
It is now possible to state succinctly what it is to advocate revolu- 
tionary violence, sadism, or boorishness. In advocating violence one may 
be speaking the language of the opposition, encouraging action which is 
so called by those under attack and which, because so called, indicates 
areas of vulnerability. The revolutionary need only realize that certain 
behavior is regarded in a way which indicates it cannot be tolerated by 
its victims and encourage it for that reason. Similarly, the sadist need not 
consider his behavior cruel so long as his victim does, and the efforts of 
the deliberate boor are repaid if he succeeds in getting others to find his 
behavior boorish. It is clear that descriptions of revolutionary violence, 
sadism, or deliberate boorishness are in a certain respect more complicated 
than cases involving purely external or purely internal attributions of vio- 
lence, cruelty, and rudeness. A revolutionary situation, for example, im- 
plies antagonism between at least two groups within what is at least by 
law or custom a single community, but since the separation between 
groups may be only partial, an advocate of violence may employ the 
same criteria of such behavior as the enemy does. Such an advocate need 
not himself be violent, especially if he has rejected only some of the 
values of his old community. If, however, such a person practices what 
he preaches, he may find his action distasteful, however necessary. In like 
manner, one may have an intellectual love of cruelty or effrontery yet 
be personally admirable; or he may indulge his love and no one admire 
him, including himself. Such complications do not, however, affect the 
general result that predicates of behavior imply that, except in periods 
of disruption not more than a few decades in length, relatively few persons 
behave in the way indicated. 
One philosophically interesting implication of these considerations is 
that it is conceptually impossible to value, or even universally prescribe, 
any of the dysfunctional patterns of behavior discussed here other than as 
a means to an end. Violence, cruelty, rudeness, and the like cannot co- 
herently be considered valuable in themselves, and to encourage them for 
themselves would not be simply fanatical but incoherent. For what would 
the recommendation, "Seek violence, and follow it!" for example, amount 
to? It could not be to recommend behavior of a specific kind, since the 
behavior which constitutes violence is subject to change. It would instead 
have to amount to "whatever is considered violent, do that!" and this is 
tantamount to "seek the state where violence is the norm!" If violence 
were the norm, however, nothing would be considered particularly vio- 
lent and the term would lack significant application. The point may be 
illustrated by means of an analogy. Compare the hypothetical value of 
12. This paragraph is, by chance, a virtual pr6cis of some remarks by Noam 
Chomsky ("Philosophers and Public Philosophy," Ethics 79 [1968]:1-2). See also J. M. 
Cameron, "The Ethics of Violence," New York Review of Books 15 (1970):24-32. 
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violence with an ideal of perfect mendacity. To urge that one always lie 
may be to urge one of two things-always to say what is false or always 
to deceive. In either case, though for different reasons, the recommenda- 
tion frustrates itself. If everyone were to begin simply to say what is false, 
then after recovery from the initial shock, accommodation to the situation 
would be easy and automatic; the use of negatives would simply alter in 
such a way that everyone would in effect quickly come to be speaking 
the truth again. If on the other hand everyone attempted systematically 
to deceive his fellows in whatever way seemed best (including speaking 
the truth), the ensuing state of continual distrust would be incompatible 
with the conditions which make occasional deception possible; where there 
is no trust the question of deception can hardly arise. Similarly, to recom- 
mend violence may be simply to recommend that one attempt to harm 
one's fellows wherever possible, or it may be to recommend promotion 
of unmoderated civil strife. In the first case avoidance of quick extinction 
of the group would seem to require development of adequate means of 
personal protection, so that pursuance of the ideal would simply result in 
a new normalization. In the second case the concept of violence ceases 
to be a workable one, for in a state of continued actual strife the standards 
by which something can be judged to be aberrant are lacking. It is a 
conspicuous failing of many systems of moral philosophy that they ignore 
the implications of the social nature of many of the facts with which they 
deal. Hobbes, for example, while realizing that concepts not relevantly 
different from violence, cruelty, and rudeness are applicable only within 
social contexts, professed to believe that in a state of nature their oppo- 
sites could be desired in foro interno.'3 In a state of actual conflict, how- 
ever, natural laws lack descriptive content, and the most one could desire 
is avoidance of injury, suffering, and the like. Given only a disposition to 
conflict, on the other hand, there may be sufficient stability to make pos- 
sible behavioral criteria for the terms of social facts. Doing so, however, 
presupposes a social (though not a political) order. The state of nature 
is simply a condition lacking the institutional facts characteristic of a po- 
litical order; it is also a social state, the facts of which are not reducible 
to individual desires and aversions. 
IV CONCLUSION 
To call behavior violent, cruel, or rude is, then, to imply that it has 
been relatively rare. To encourage a general disposition to violence, 
cruelty, or rudeness would be to urge that such behavior be frequent, 
and the success of the appeal would have the consequence that the be- 
havior previously encouraged cease to be regarded in the original way; 
either social ties dissolve and men become accustomed to the life described 
by Hobbes or men accommodate to the new forms of behavior, institu- 
tionalizing them under such titles as "sport" and "affairs of honor" or 
13. Leviathan, chap. 15. 
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otherwise legitimizing and rationalizing them as "daring," "power," and 
the like. In any case the antisocial character of the behavior is suppressed. 
It is initially curious that substantially similar remarks must be made 
about the functional counterparts of aberrant modes of behavior, but in 
one respect the cases are importantly different. It is true that only the 
first part of the admonition to "seek peace, and follow it!" can be heeded 
for an extended period, for if what is regarded as peace were attained 
and sustained the term would cease to modify terms for individuals and 
phenomena significantly. The background of contrasting behavior which 
permits the word to be used in significant characterizations would be lack- 
ing. Rather than to say that the second imperative is incoherent, however, 
this is to say that it is trivial, proscribing only deviation from the norm, 
since terms which indicate a norm are only trivially applied to normal 
behavior. The crucial difference between peace, kindness, courtesy, and 
the like, and violence, cruelty, and rudeness, the one which dictates that 
the former are norms and the latter aberrations is, of course, that the 
former express cooperation and promote stability while the latter express 
animosity and promote destruction. Since instances of behavior of each 
kind constitute social facts, it is trivial that only facts of the former kind 
can correspond to social norms. 
Peace, kindness, courtesy, and the like can no more be valued as ends 
than violence, cruelty, or rudeness; they are simply means for the avoid- 
ance of things-injury, suffering, offense-pursuance of which would 
make social relationships very unstable. For this reason there is no possi- 
bility that behavior which is at one time or place regarded as extremely 
violent, cruel, or rude be at another time or place regarded as perfectly 
peaceful, kind, or courteous. For although such assessments may vary 
through a considerable range, the need for reference to human harm pre- 
vents the purely formal structure of norms and aberrations sketched here 
from being interpreted in any arbitrary way. There may, indeed, come a 
day in which the defeat of peculiar social dogmas which divert attention 
from human similarities, and make men more tolerant of harm to them- 
selves and others than need be the case, results in a common behavioral 
standard for already undeniable principles. By emphasizing the importance 
of improved perception of relatively brute facts, the results of this study 
are readily interpreted to express a strongly teleological view. Increasing 
recognition of the artificiality of many social distinctions should mean 
diminishing differences in the occurrence and identification of social facts 
from group to group, though room for social diversity may remain in 
the games societies play-the narrower institutional facts characteristic of 
individual societies. In this eventuality Bacon's observation may be read 
as he intended it, as a comment not about nations and their idols but 
about the nature of man. 
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